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The ability to challenge and revise thoughts prompted by anomalous experiences depends
on activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal circuitry. When activity in those circuits is absent
or compromised subjects are less likely to make this kind of correction. This appears
to be the cause of some delusions of misidentification consequent on experiences of
hyperfamiliarity for faces. Comparing the way the mind responds to the experience
of hyperfamiliarity in different conditions such as delusions, dreams, pathological and
non-pathological déjà vu, provides a way to understand claims that delusions and dreams
are both states characterized by deficient “reality testing.”
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of impaired or absent “reality testing” is invoked to
explain conditions characterized by persistent inability to detect
and correct misrepresentation of aspects of the world (reality).
On this model hallucinations result from faulty reality testing
in a perceptual modality and false memories result from faulty
reality testing in mnemonic mode (Hobson, 1999; Bentall, 2004;
Moulin, 2013). Allan Hobson has described some dreams as states
in which a capacity for “reality testing” is deactivated by basic
neuroregulatory mechanisms.
In my New Orleans dream I hallucinated: I saw and heard things
that weren’t in my bedroom. I was deluded: I believed that the
dream actions were real despite gross internal inconsistencies.
(Hobson, 1999, p. 5). (my italics)
Clearly Hobson thinks that in this dream he accepted hallu-
cinatory experience at face value, the equivalent of “seeing as
believing,” with the crucial difference that in dreams we do not
see but hallucinate. One dream theorist describes the experi-
ence of dreaming “as if one is immersed in another ‘reality’
entirely of one’s own non-volitional, making (see Rechtschaffen,
1997).” The cause of this immersion in another reality is that
“altered functioning of the prefrontal cortex may release from
reality-filtering or executive constraint an innate human tendency
to create stories that organize past, present, and future reality”
(Pace-Schott, 2013).
In other words in these episodes of sleep we lose the ability
to detect whether or not sensory or perceptual experience repre-
sents reality. What is important here is that Pace-Schott suggests
that this results from the deactivation of a neural mechanism for
Reality-monitoring or, as he calls it, “filtering.”
These ideas have become relevant to characterization of delu-
sion following recent attempts to conceptualize it as a failure of
“doxastic reality testing.” Doxastic reality testing refers to the abil-
ity to test experiential beliefs for consistency and correctness with
background knowledge, thereby establishing whether they cor-
respond to the world as it is, independent of the subject’s mind
(Hohwy, 2004). It is for reasons like these that dreams and delu-
sions are both described as states in which a capacity for “reality
testing” is reduced or absent.
Richard Bentall, who is an advocate of a version of the “real-
ity testing” model of delusion and hallucination, proposes that we
think of reality testing on a model of signal detection. Perceptual
systems on this view are essentially hypothesis testers: they adopt
the best hypothesis about the causes of transduced inputs and
that hypothesis becomes a representation of the external world
(Bentall, 1990).
Hallucinations arise when faulty hypotheses are generated, and
maintained when they are unable to be tested and/or revised. This
model is now a substantial research program into the neurobi-
ological basis of predictive coding in many cognitive modalities
(See Friston, 2003; Hohwy et al., 2008; Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Corlett et al., 2010; Clark, 2012; Hohwy, 2012) On this view delu-
sions are instances of the same phenomenon as hallucinations
at higher levels of cognitive processing. Both involve, hypothe-
sis testing and revision in order to cancel error signals, which
arise at lower/earlier stages of cognitive processing. People with
delusions form hypotheses that make sense of sensory evidence.
These beliefs serve asmodels of the world, which interpret sensory
inputs.
When patients are unable to test or revise false hypotheses,
false beliefs persist (Coltheart et al., 2010).When such false beliefs
fit the diagnostic criteria for delusion in DSM IV (“false beliefs
about external reality caused by incorrect inference. . . ”) or V they
can be understood as delusions caused by faulty “reality testing.”
Because DSM criteria are controversial among both practitioners
and theorists (note that on the DSM IV definition Hobson is not
right to equate dreams with delusions because it is not clear that
he was performing any inference about experience in his dream),
I limit my discussion here to a subclass of well-defined delusions
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of misidentification (see below). These delusions involve anoma-
lous experiences that have clear analogs in some types of dreams
(see below). In delusions those experiences prompt beliefs that are
not revised in the face of background knowledge. Quite why those
beliefs are not revised remains elusive, although it does seem clear,
at least in the cases of delusion I discuss here, that essential pre-
frontal systems are conspicuously deactivated. Thus, if we could
establish how those prefrontal systems enable anomalous experi-
ence to be overridden or explained away in alert waking cognition,
we would have a potential explanation of the relationship between
delusion, dreaming and normal cognition.
One advantage of the reality testing paradigm is that, like
other cognitive approaches, it offers the potential to understand
a puzzling phenomenon, delusion, whose characterization is the-
oretically controversial, in terms of a better understood cognitive
process, reality testing. The crudest application of the idea would
be that those systems deactivated in dreams are the neural imple-
mentation of a “reality testing” system. Delusion is a waking state
in which those systems are also hypoactive or compromised.
Unfortunately, as Bentall himself notes, reality testing itself is a
term of art. It combines an intuitive definition of what is going on
in delusion (people form and maintain beliefs which are at odds
with reality) with formalization, in the form of Bayesian infer-
ence, which allows for experimental manipulation. As he says:
there is no reason to believe that perceptual states have the labels
“real” or “imaginary” printed on them. We have to infer how
best to describe any particular experience from whatever infor-
mation there is available to us, and there is no unique source of
information that we can rely on to make this judgment (Bentall,
2004, p. 364).
Bentall is right that there is no unique source of information
that could tell us whether a representation is “real” or not. Nor, ex
hypothesi is there a unique cognitive process evolved or developed
to detect those labels. Thus, the concept of “reality testing” used
in this way is unconstrained. It is by no means clear
(i) that the mind has evolved a cognitive system specialized for
testing representations for “reality” rather than, for exam-
ple, congruence with domain specific internal models. In the
case of some non-veridical memory experiences, for exam-
ple, subjects may feel as if they are remembering a previous
experience. This phenomenon of feeling as though an expe-
rience is a memory is baptized “déjà vécu” (Moulin, 2013).
This arises from a faulty signal of congruence between a cur-
rent representation and a previously constructed one rather
than a signal that a memory is “real.”
(ii) that such a capacity (mal)functions in the same way across
cognitive modalities (perception, memory, belief) and in
delusions and dreams. Nonetheless in this paper I cau-
tiously pursue the idea that Bentall and Hobson are on the
right track. Phenomenological similarities between (some)
delusions and dreams, combined with some similarities in
patterns of global neural activation and deactivation sup-
port the idea that delusions and dreams may have some
important cognitive properties in common (Schredl and
Hofmann, 2003; Noreika, 2011; Windt and Noreika, 2011).
Not only that, but those cognitive properties may underwrite
capacities for what is loosely described as reality testing. As
John Nash explained his delusions to an interviewer “it’s
kind of like a dream. In a dream it’s typical not to be ratio-
nal” (Nash, 2002) I think Nash intended to characterize the
similarity between dreams and delusions, not in terms of a
reasoning deficit (after all Nash remained capable of high-
level mathematical and logical reasoning while delusional),
but in terms of an absence of reasoning about experiences
and thoughts which would in neurotypical waking cognition
prompt some kind of metacognitive response.
Clearly delusions are not simply waking dreams, nor are the expe-
riences that prompt them simply accepted without metacognitive
evaluation (this is also true of some dreams in which people
are aware of the anomalous nature of experience). Nonetheless
some delusions do seem to involve abnormalities in the way peo-
ple respond to experiences whose content would typically be
detected and rejected as anomalous. An instructive comparison
is provided by déjà or jamais vu (Sno, 2000). Such experiences,
which I will characterize as the experience of hyper-and hypofa-
miliarity for places (see below), are relatively common and may
even trigger thoughts such as “I’ve (never) been here before”.
However, such thoughts are not typically elaborated or incor-
porated into the subject’s belief system. If, however, a subject of
a déjà vu experience continued to maintain that she had previ-
ously visited the place in question and even elaborated that belief,
confabulating corroborative detail, she might attract a diagno-
sis of delusion of misidentification for place. She would have an
intractable false belief, based on faulty inference about the cause
of her experience (in this cases hyperfamiliarity), namely, that her
experience of familiarity was based on veridical recognition. Such
cases have been baptized Recollective Confabulation by Moulin
(2013; O’Connor et al., 2010).
There is evidence that ability to correct or override these
kinds of thoughts triggered by experience depends on activity
in right dorsolateral prefrontal circuitry. When activity in those
circuits is absent or compromised subjects are less likely to chal-
lenge and revise thoughts prompted by anomalous experiences
and may adopt them as beliefs (Gilbert et al., 2010; Barbey
and Patterson, 2011; Barbey et al., 2013). This hypothesis fits
the evidence about the cause of some delusions of misiden-
tification characterized by anomalies of familiarity consequent
on lesion to the right fusiform gyrus (a circuit known to be
implicated in face recognition) accompanied by lesion to right
dorsolateral prefrontal circuitry. Within a classic neuropsycholog-
ical framework this suggests that an erroneous signal of (hypo- or
hyper-) familiarity for a seen face generates a belief which cannot
be corrected due to hypoactivity in the dorsolaterally-regulated
systems (Papageorgiou et al., 2003, 2005).
Does this suggest that our capacity to reject thoughts trig-
gered by such experiences depends on a capacity for “reality
testing” part of whose neural substrate is dorsolateral prefrontal
circuitry? I shall argue that this is not quite the right way to
explain the difference between the delusional and non-delusional
response. An important part of my argument is consideration
of the way in which anomalous experiences of familiarity arise
and are processed (or not processed) metacognitively in dreams.
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Triangulating between the three cases, dreams, delusions and alert
waking cognition allows us to deconstruct the concept of “real-
ity testing.” There is of course an important caveat to be entered
here: hyperfamiliarity for places and faces and the responses they
engender in dreams, delusions and alert waking cognition are
different cognitive phenomena. Nonetheless there is a consen-
sus, on which I draw, that experience of familiarity for faces and
places depends on similar cognitive processes (O’Connor and
Moulin, 2010; O’Connor et al., 2010). In addition some dream
theorists have explicitly made the connection between hyperfa-
miliarity for faces in dreams and delusions based on the nature
of cognitive processing in face and place recognition (Revonsuo
and Tarkko, 2002). Thus, I will assume that we can draw some
interesting conclusions about the way in which anomalous expe-
riences are dealt with by looking at differences in the way themind
responds to anomalies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions
and non-delusional waking cognition.
HYPER- AND HYPOFAMILIARITY
In delusions of misidentification people report seeing “doubles,”
imposters, people in disguise, people changing appearance and
identity (Ellis, 1998; Breen et al., 2000; Ellis and Lewis, 2001).
The phenomenology of these delusions can be explained in terms
of abnormalities of face-processing that produce a representation
in which elements normally bound together such as face, name,
autonomic response to a familiar person, and identity may dis-
sociate (Revonsuo and Salmivalli, 1995; Revonsuo and Tarkko,
2002; Noreika et al., 2010a). For example if a representation of
the facial appearance of a spouse is not bound to information
about familiarity which drives autonomic response the result
will be an incongruity: the patient sees a person who appears
familiar but she does not have a characteristic autonomic reac-
tion to that person. This incongruity, produced by the failure to
bind the familiar face to a signal initiating autonomic response,
leads to the delusional response: “my wife has been replaced by
an imposter.” This is the Capgras delusion, which explains the
experience of hypofamiliarity for a familiar face. Another delu-
sion of misidentification is the Fregoli delusion in which people
say that they are being followed by a familiar person in dis-
guise (de Pauw et al., 1987; Joseph and O’Leary, 1987; Eva and
Perry, 1993; Ellis et al., 1994; Wolfe andMcKenzie, 1994; Ellis and
Szulecka, 1996). In this case the patient sees a stranger and does
not recognize her, but experiences the feeling of familiarity. The
Fregoli delusion is generated to explain this mismatch between
feeling as though the seen person is familiar combined with
inability to recognize them. Thus, these delusions are responses
to the experience of hypofamiliarity and hyperfamiliarity
respectively.
The standard account of these responses is that they are empir-
ical beliefs, that is beliefs adopted to explain experience (Maher
and Ross, 1984). The key explanandum then becomes the dif-
ference between the way delusional and non-delusional minds
respond to anomalous experiences whose content is inconsistent
with background knowledge.
Dream experience becomes relevant to this issue because many
dreams involve experiences that are highly inconsistent with back-
ground knowledge. Often, however, in dreams (at least of the
type discussed by Hobson above) no background knowledge is
brought to bear and experiences are not explained or explained
away. Most dream theorists explain this in terms of deactiva-
tion of neural circuitry required for the necessary metacognitive
processing (Solms, 2000; Gottesmann, 2010; Domhoff, 2011).
Their focus then becomes clarifying the nature of that process-
ing and the way neural mechanisms implement it. A crucial part
of that project is comparing metacognitive function in differ-
ent modes of waking, sleeping and dreaming. Bizarre experiences
of misidentification occur in dreams (Revonsuo and Salmivalli,
1995; Röhrenbach and Landis, 1995; Kahn et al., 2002; Revonsuo
and Tarkko, 2002; Schwartz and Maquet, 2002; Desseilles et al.,
2011). Revonsuo and Tarkko (2002) analyzed 592 dream reports
that contained bizarre dream characters (people who appear in
dreams). The authors noted that inappropriate feelings of famil-
iarity are one of the most commonly reported bizarre dream
experiences and explained their occurrence as follows: “we may
interpret the abundance of pseudo-familiar persons in dreams
as over-activation of face recognition units: they fire even when
the face percept does not correspond to any of the descriptions
in the store. This creates the inappropriate feeling of familiarity”
(Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002; Schwartz and Maquet, 2002).
Schwartz and Maquet (2002) note in their discussion of dream
experience that it includes similarities to many other cases char-
acteristic of neuropsychological disorder such as achromatopsia
(inability to perceive color) and polyopsia (perception of mul-
tiple images of a single object). These cases can be explained in
terms of abnormal patterns of activity produced when later stage
of processing in the ventral visual stream are driven by subcor-
tical afferents rather than its usual inputs from early vision. The
result is bizarre juxtaposition of representational elements whose
assembly into a coherent representation is normally driven by
early perceptual processing.
Crucially one of those elements is the feeling of familiarity.
There are different explanations of the nature of this feeling. On
one view, popular in the face recognition literature, the feeling is
an affective one consequent on the process of identification. These
models give a prominent role to the amygdala in generating that
feeling, postulating disturbances to connectivity between the face
recognition circuitry and downstream affective processing.
Interestingly, (see below), this view receives some support
from the literature on déjà vu which notes many cases of persis-
tent and unfocused déjà vu in temporal lobe epilepsy. In these
cases the feeling is persistent and pervasive and everything feels
strangely “familiar” (Illman et al., 2012).
Another view describes the feeling as an instance of higher
order “cognitive feelings” (O’Connor et al., 2010),that is as a dis-
tinctive form of phenomenology, generated by process of recog-
nition, which does not necessarily involve downstream affective
processing. It is worth mentioning that the “cognitive feel-
ing” interpretation is most strongly argued for another type of
case, déjà vecu, in which people report genuinely remembering
episodes of experience that could not have occurred. These cases
are distinguished from déjà vu (driven by perceptual recognition)
because the relevant signal, generated in the process of mnemonic
retrieval, informs the subject that the information retrieved is
familiar (O’Connor et al., 2010).
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Slightly different juxtapositions of identifying information
in dreams have been remarked on by Schwartz and Maquet
(Röhrenbach and Landis, 1995; Schwartz and Maquet, 2002,
p. 26). They use the following examples. “I had a talk with
your colleague but she looked differently, much younger, like
someone I went to school with, perhaps a 13 year old girl.” In
another case a subject reported “I recognize A’s sister. I am sur-
prised by her beard. She looks much more like a man, with
a beard and a big nose” Schwarz and Maquet describe these
as Fregoli-like phenomena generated by activation in the facial
fusiform area.
An interesting feature of these reports is that the mismatch
here is between facial appearance and identity (“your sister”)
rather than facial appearance and a feeling of familiarity. In
this sense these cases resemble the phenomenon described by
Revonsuo and Tarkko (2002) as appearing infrequently in dreams
“cases of imposter relatives; persons we have never met in the real
world but who we accept as our ‘sisters’ ‘brothers’ or ‘cousins’ or
‘uncles’ in the dream.”
The binding hypothesis suggests that representations of
appearance and identity are bound to signals of familiarity and
that the binding process can go awry in different ways, generat-
ing different forms of misbinding between identity, appearance
and familiarity. The binding hypothesis suggests that the pro-
cessing involved in recognition of a familiar face generates a
signal of familiarity that produces (directly or via the activation
of downstream affective processes) feelings of familiarity, which
can, in anomalous cases, generate feelings of hyperfamiliarity.
The binding hypothesis also explains the nature of the anoma-
lous experience characteristic of Fregoli and Capgras delusions.
They involve the experience of familiarity for unfamiliar faces and
unfamiliarity for familiar faces respectively.
Some recent work on déjà vu provides a further basis for the
idea that feelings of familiarity can dissociate from recognition
and that this dissociation can lead to delusions of misrecogni-
tion. We noted above that while fleeting experience of déjà vu
is common associated delusions are rare: we rarely encounter
someone with the delusion that they have previously visited an
unfamiliar house. Yet clinicians encounter something very like
such a delusion in recollective confabulation (RC). In recollec-
tive confabulation a subject experiences something like déjà vu for
a place or event and then explains that experience by construct-
ing an account of a previous encounter to fit with that feeling of
familiarity (Moulin, 2013).
An important point to note about recollective confabulation is
that it is initiated by feelings of familiarity for a novel object rather
than the process of recollection per se. The patients in question
have relatively intact recollective processes in standard tests, and
Alzheimer’s patients with recollective problems do not necessarily
have déjà vu or recollective confabulation (Moulin, 2013).
The hypothesis of Moulin (2013) is that when we recognize
or recall a familiar event very early processes generate a signal of
familiarity and that signal initiates subsequent processes of rep-
resenting the event in detail: “a fast familiarity response guides
retrieval processes until recollection provides a subjective feel-
ing of remembering and additional contextual information” (p.
1551). At a subsequent stage the filling in of details becomes
explicit and analytic. Thus, “RC would not be caused by a deficit
in recollection per se but the use of somewhat intact recollection
processes to justify feelings of familiarity” (p. 1542).
Déjà vu-type experiences occur when feelings of familiarity
are triggered incorrectly. The patient is then in a situation of
experiencing familiarity, which normally drives recollection and
further elaboration of contextual detail. The patient proceeds to
this stage, producing the recollective confabulation.
Moulin (2013) explicitly draws an analogy between this pro-
cess and the generation of delusions of misidentification for (un)
familiar faces. “Critically, delusional misidentifications or peo-
ple, places and time, have been hypothesized as resulting from
memory-like disruptions to feelings of familiarity.” Following
Feinberg and Shapiro he describes these delusions as “an illogi-
cal attempt—a confabulation- of why ‘the familiar is experienced
as strange or vice versa”’ (p. 46, 1542).
METACOGNITIVE FAILURE
Moulin like many theorists notes that that déjà vu, even persistent
déjà vu, does not normally lead to the type of false belief generated
by recollective confabulation. Confabulation and delusion are not
easy to distinguish. On some views they are very closely related.
Moulin for example equates delusions of misidentification and
reflective confabulation: “the patient will justify this mismatch
with the belief [Capgras delusion].” And reflective confabulation
involves the use of “intact recollective processes to justify feelings
of familiarity” (p. 1542).
Confabulation is the process of generating a story consistent
with experience, which is not constrained by epistemic norms of
consistency and coherence. As long as the confabulation “fits” the
experience it is adopted and sometimes elaborated irrespective
of whether or not it is consistent with background knowledge.
One interesting thing about confabulation is that it often coex-
ists with intact capacities for reasoning on topics other than the
confabulated belief.
The equation of confabulation and delusion is most persuasive
in cases of beliefs generated as a response to experiences of patho-
logical familiarity, because such beliefs often arise in cases whose
cognitive structure resembles the pattern of deficits in classic con-
fabulation: a deficit in a perceptual system (in this case a face or
place recognition) combined with a deficit in right prefrontal sys-
tems. The first generates the relevant experience and the second
makes it impossible to override a confabulatory response to that
experience.
For example Moulin explains the persistence of the confabu-
lation as a consequence of a metacognitive deficit that produces
“the failure tometacognitively oppose that evaluation” (p. 1549).
Thus, Moulin’s discussion of reflective confabulation for déjà
vu suggests a cognitive structure for dealing with anomalous
experience. The experience is initially dealt with by systems that
“justify” the experience. Crucially this justification is responsive
only to the experience itself : the delusions of misidentification and
reflective confabulation for pathological déjà vu provide a belief
adequate to the feeling of hyperfamiliarity for face or location.
That belief however is inconsistent with readily available general
knowledge: imposters and previous acquaintance with strange
locations arehighlyunlikely. In thenormal courseof events general
knowledge triumphs. But somehow the delusion/confabulation
is not overridden by background knowledge.
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This suggests that in the normal course of events we rapidly
construct a justification for anomalous experience adequate only
to the experience itself, which is overridden if it turns out to be
inconsistent with background knowledge. Ultimately we adopt an
hypothesis that fits the anomalous experience into an epistemic
framework. A sudden headache prompts the thought “I have
brain cancer” but we almost instantaneously challenge that belief
and substitute it with another (“my skateboard accident”, “my
cage fighting audition”) drawn from a wider epistemic context.
It is that second step which is unavailable to the deluded in these
cases.
An important cause of that unavailability seems to be hypoac-
tivity or lesion to right dorsolateral prefrontal areas. Moulin
locates these deficits as crucial to the metacognitive failure
involved in recollective confabulation.
Crucially similar deficits have also been observed in delu-
sions of misidentification. Papageorgeiou et al. studied nine
patients with delusions of misidentification, Capgras, Fregoli,
Intermetamorphosis, with some patients suffering more than one
of these delusions (Papageorgiou et al., 2003, 2005). The 2005
study measured event-related potential (ERP) focusing on the
P300 ERP component. The delusional patients group showed sig-
nificant reductions in P300 amplitude in frontal areas of the right
hemisphere compared to controls.
The conclusion that hypoactivity of the frontal lobe of the right
hemisphere is involved in delusion is consistent with other neu-
ropsychological studies. For example in a group of 33 patients
with Alzheimer’s disease, of whom 18 had a content specific delu-
sion concerning place, person or object, Single Positron Emission
Topography revealed hypoperfusion in frontal lobe of the right
hemisphere in the delusional groups compared to the 15 non-
delusional sufferers (Coltheart, 2007).
These and other cases lead Coltheart to conclude that it is
specifically deficits in the frontal lobe of the right hemisphere that
are the cause of the failure to challenge the delusional belief in
delusions of misidentification. He describes those circuits as the
substrate for a system of “belief evaluation” which reconciles can-
didate beliefs with background knowledge according to Bayesian
principles of abductive inference. When they are lesioned or
hypoactive the patient remains hostage not to experience but to
a belief adequate only to experience, not the wider epistemic
context.
I endorse this account but I think that it leaves out something
that is hinted at but underdescribed in Moulin’s account, namely
the origin of the candidate belief that survives as recollective con-
fabulation or delusion. The belief for example that “I have been
here before” or “I am being followed by a stranger in disguise,”
while it is adequate to the experience, does not simply report an
experience of hyperfamiliarity.
It provides a context that makes it intelligible. The crucial
question is why this process of contextualization does not seem
to incorporate relevant background knowledge, including other
beliefs about likely causes, and the implausibility of the delu-
sion. The patient’s belief is just about the most unlikely empirical
hypothesis. This is why the DSM IV defined delusion as “a false
belief about external reality based on incorrect inference.”
The cognitive relationship between delusions and dreams
helps explain the exclusion of background knowledge from this
process of contextualization. Dreams are produced by activation
in a neural system, the default mode network, which provides the
raw materials for confabulations and delusions as well as narra-
tive contexts for salient experience in waking cognition. When
we compare the activities of the default mode network in dif-
ferent conditions we can see why the delusional patient does not
override her implausible belief.
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
Unlike other animals we can re-experience the past (episodic
memory) in order to preexperience the future (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 2007; Botzung et al., 2008). In order to do this we
simulate experiences, running the relevant neural mechanisms
offline. This role of simulation in planning provides a new, unify-
ing, interpretation of the connection between episodic memory
(recollection) and prospection as aspects of a unified capacity
for stimulus-independent thought (Schacter et al., 2000, 2007,
2008). This view is supported by evidence that damage to neu-
ral circuitry known to be essential for episodic memory also
impairs imagination (Hassabis andMaguire, 2007, 2009; Hassabis
et al., 2007; Maguire et al., 2010; Maguire and Hassabis, 2011).
This simulatory capacity employed in the service of planning
is now baptized mental time travel to capture the fact that it
allows us to escape the stimulus-bound present, review the past
and preview the future by projecting ourselves into different
scenarios. Basically it allows us to simulate alternative personal
histories. This type of simulation provides the subject with a sub-
jective, highly emotionally inflected, representation of the world
based in her own experiential history and imaginative capaci-
ties (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Christoff et al., 2009). This
subjectivity is, of course, vital for action: if our plans were not
inflected by emotional and motivational states and were not
biased to the first-personal perspective they would not be useful
guides to action. In deciding whether to remarry or change jobs
one’s own life experience is what matters. The fact that someone
else would enjoy being married to X or working in a certain job is
only incidentally relevant.
The relevant circuitry which enables us to recall and rehearse
experiences is (slightly misleadingly) named the default mode
network (DMN) because its activities are detected in a variety
of “resting” scenarios as well as during active mental time travel
(Mason et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Broyd et al., 2009).
Thus, DMN activity is observed, not only in memory, imagina-
tion and planning, but also in daydreaming and mindwandering
as it is known: states of reverie in which narrative fragments
combine and recombine semi-spontaneously. The best interpre-
tation of these phenomena I suggest is that when the DMN is
not actively controlled during a specific task of building a context
for action (imagining the torture of attending another commit-
tee meeting on “online pedagogy” as a prelude to resigning from
the university) it continues to run in what amounts to a screen-
saver mode. Running in this way it is available to be triggered
to provide a context for any novel information referred by per-
ceptual processes or to provide narrative scenarios as solutions to
longer-term problems.
The fact that we call undirected activity in the default network
daydreaming is revealing because another conditions in which the
DMN is active is dreaming. As Domhoff puts it:
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the likely neural substrate that supports dreaming, which was
discovered through converging lesion and neuroimaging stud-
ies, may be a subsystem of the waking default network, which is
active during mind wandering, daydreaming, and simulation. . . If
this theory is correct, then dreaming may be the quintessential
cognitive simulation (2011 1163). See also Fox et al. (2013)
There are a variety of conditions in which the DMN is engaged.
One is planning which combines experiential memory and imagi-
nation, which often go together: we review the past to preview the
future. This is a condition in which the default system is recruited
for a specific goal: the evaluation of actual and possible experience
relevant to a specific outcome or event. Effectively we rehearse a
mini-narrative or episode with ourselves as the central character.
In cases where we empathize or solve social problems by simulat-
ing other’s experience the DMN is also engaged, consistent with
the hypothesis that some aspects of social cognition involve per-
sonal simulation (Mitchell et al., 2005; Klein, 2011; Reniers et al.,
2012). However, the DMN is also relatively active in daydreaming,
mind wandering and unfocussed rumination. As Broyd and col-
laborators put it: the properties of the default network reflect “low
frequency toggling between a task-independent self-referential
and introspective state [daydreaming] and an exteroceptive state
that ensures the individual is alert and attentive to unexpected or
novel environmental events.” (Broyd et al., 2009, p. 281).
This suggests a role for the DMN consistent with theories of
cognitive architecture that treat it as an hierarchical error cor-
rection system. The basic idea is that higher levels of cognitive
control are activated by signals of discrepancy or error which can-
not be resolved at lower levels. Anomalous experiences in effect
represent problems which cannot be solved at lower levels by per-
ceptual and sensory systems. Higher levels of executive control
then are engaged to resolve the problem (Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Clark, 2012).
The first stage is to provide an autobiographical context for
the experience: to rehearse scenarios in which such experiences
have or could occur as a way of gathering information relevant to
responding. The so called DMN is essentially a mechanism which
evolved to provide these kinds of actual and possible contexts for
experiences.
This interpretation is supported by considering the tasks for
which the DMN is not recruited. When the mind is directing
perceptual attention (focused on features of the environment),
solving abstract problems or reevaluating goals and strategies
the default network is not engaged. As Whitfield-Gabrieli and
Ford put it: the “DMN in the healthy brain is associated with
stimulus-independent thought and self-reflection and . . . greater
suppression of the DMN is associated with better performance
on attention-demanding tasks” (Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford,
2012, p. 49).
The DMN is essentially a mechanism for constructing the
elements of personal narratives: stories and s which make expe-
rience intelligible in terms of goals and motives. As Pace-Schott
describes it the DMN is the substrate of a capacity “to repre-
sent reality in the form of narrative—a ‘story-telling’ instinct or
module” (Pace-Schott, 2013). Thus, we can picture the DMN as
a mechanism which provides a necessary subjective perspective
on experiences, locating them in personally and or socially com-
pelling narratives. The same information can also be represented
neutrally and impartially as pure description or theoretical expla-
nation, but such representations are processed by different cogni-
tive systems. The processes which accomplish these forms of rep-
resentation are baptized decontextualized processes by cognitive
psychologists.
In fact there is evidence that the DMN needs to be deac-
tivated for these kinds of decontextualized cognitive processes.
Subjects (including delusional subjects) who have hyperactive or
hyperassociative DMN perform poorly at tasks which require
decontextualization such as symbolic reasoning and memory
tasks (Broyd et al., 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011). A cru-
cial hub of decontextualized processing is the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex.
These facts help clarify the nature of the “metacognitive
deficit” identified byMoulin in his cases of recollective confabula-
tion and delusions of misidentification. An hypothesis which fits
the evidence is that these patients have the anomalous experience
of hyperfamiliarity for places or faces. That experience is in effect
an error signal to higher-order cognitive processes that something
unpredicted has occurred. The mind’s initial response is to build
a narrative context, a story, which fits the experience and locates
the subject in relation to it. “I’ve been here before. . . ” “A familiar
person disguised as a stranger is following me.” Such responses
are quite natural as fleeting thoughts occasioned by instances of
déjà vu remind us.
However, as such cases also reminds us, we have the capacity
to correct or override these stories. But in order to do so we need
a fully functioning capacity for decontextualization which allows
us to treat the story element as an hypothesis to be disconfirmed
or confirmed by evidence, rather than a narrative element which
provides an intentional interpretation of an experience.
However, as we saw in the classic cases of pathological déjà vu
and recollective confabulation discussed by Moulin and the cases
of delusional misidentification discussed by Papageorgeiou this
type of decontextualization depends on activity in right dorso-
lateral prefrontal circuitry. Where those circuits are lesioned or
hypoactive the patient seems unable to override the delusional or
confabultory hypothesis. It is worth noting although I do not dis-
cuss it here that the relevant hypoactivity may in some other cases
of delusion be relative to activity in the DMN rather than abso-
lute as in lesions. But lesions to the rDLPFC, in combination with
lesions to right frontal areas involved in recognition provide the
purest cases of anomalous experience combined with inability to
decontextualize. In such cases patients are cognitive hostages to
their narrative impulse.
Should we describe someone unable to override a thought
generated as a personal narrative context for an experience
as suffering from problems with “reality testing”? Coltheart
(2007) describes such people (although he does not specify the
mechanism which generates the thought) as having a deficit in
“belief evaluation” by which he means Bayesian confirmation.
Moulin calls it a deficit in metacognition involved in “challeng-
ing” the relevant thought.
My view is that the condition is sufficiently well described
when we identify the cognitive nature of default processes and
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the decontextualized processes which normally supervise them.
It is at this point that the nature of dream experience becomes
relevant once again. Not only are some dreams characterized by
the experience of hyperfamiliarity but they are also characterized
by activity in the default network accompanied by deactivation of
the rDLPFC.
DREAMS
Dreams are not a monolithic cognitive phenomenon. They
include terrifying fully immersive nightmares as well as lucid
dreams, in which the dreamer is aware of the fact that she is
dreaming (Blagrove and Hartnell, 2000; LaBerge, 2007; Hobson,
2009a,b; Noreika et al., 2010b; Spoormaker et al., 2010); non-
rapid eye movement (NREM) dreaming, often characterized by
high degree of coherence and resemblance to actual, often stereo-
typical, scenarios; and the kinds of immersive and sometimes
bizarre dream experiences described by Hobson in which the
subject is unaware that she is dreaming and seems to accept
anomalies of experience that would in waking cognition attract
explanation.
It is this last type in which we are interested. They occur
in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, a state characterized by
patterns of activity in the DMN that resemble activity dur-
ing wakefulness (Solms, 2000; Domhoff, 2005; LaBerge, 2007).
Importantly, during REM sleep the DMN is not communicat-
ing with areas responsible for other cognitive processes. During
REM sleep, for example the mind is relatively disengaged from
the perceivable environment, and the rDLPRC and some medial
prefrontal regions are conspicuously deactivated (Schwartz and
Maquet, 2002; Hobson, 2009a,b; Nir and Tononi, 2010).
Thus, dreams represent an extreme case of hyperassociative
default processing, “a unique and more fully developed form of
mind wandering, and therefore . . . the quintessential cognitive
simulation” (Domhoff, 2011, p. 1172). Subcortical inputs to the
default system in dreams come from limbic and dopaminergic
systems. The latter is the mind’s salience system, which evolved
to make some representations highly salient, making them pop
out of the cognitive background, command attention and engage
motivational systems. Thus, in some REM dreams the default
system churns through representations of scenes which can feel
significant and emotionally charged (Hobson, 1999; Solms, 2007;
Dawson and Conduit, 2011; Desseilles et al., 2011). The connec-
tion between dreams and delusions noted on phenomenological
grounds by many patients and clinicians and on neurobiologi-
cal grounds can thus be explained in neurocognitive terms. REM
dreams are characterized by DMN activity where the default sys-
tem is not playing its waking functional role of providing an auto-
biographical narrative context for salient experiences. Rather it
seems to be manufacturing story fragments and scenarios whose
patterns of association reflect the way activation propagates in a
disinhibited DMN.
Gottesman puts things this way “the dorsolateral pre-
frontal deactivation observed both during REM sleep and in
schizophrenia seems to suppress or decrease its own functions,
including the loss or decrease of reflectiveness, and at the same
time disinhibits older subcortical structures and correspond-
ing functions, with the exaggeration of accumbens’ and amyg-
dala nuclei’s own processes: in our case, the appearance of
hallucinations, delusions, bizarre thought processes, and affective
disturbances (Gottesmann, 2006).
Clearly the causal route to reduced rDLPFC activity is different
in the cases of dreaming, schizophrenic psychosis and the delu-
sions of misidentification we discuss. In dreams this deactivation
of the rDLPFC and relative hyperactivation of the default network
is a result of changes in the balance of cholinergic and aminer-
gic regulation of the brain. In the Delusional Misidentification
Syndromes described by Papageorgeiou (and in typical cases of
confabulation) there is lesion to the rDLPFC. In schizophrenia
relative hyperactivity of the DMN is the product of a complex set
of interactions between different brain systems. A common factor
is the reduction or absence of DLPFC activity.
Precisely how to characterize cognitively the dysregulated
activity of the DMN in REM dreams remains an open ques-
tion. Hobson treats it as the equivalent of psychosis. Pace-Schott
has proposed that REM dreams are in fact stories, or represent
the activity of a story-telling system disconnected from execu-
tive control. “Therefore, in both confabulation and dreaming,
altered functioning of the prefrontal cortex may release from
reality-filtering or executive constraint an innate human tendency
to create stories that organize past, present, and future reality.
Dreaming may represent a potent, naturally occurring form of
confabulation in which imaginary events are not only created and
believed but are vividly experienced as organized, multimodal
hallucinations” (Hobson, 1999; Pace-Schott and Hobson, 2007;
Pace-Schott, 2013).
So although activity across the brain is different in the two
cases of delusion and REM dreaming an important similarity
between dreams and delusions is reduced or absent activity in the
rDLPFC which leaves the subject “at the mercy” of the DMN.
CONCLUSION
Some theorists and patients have assimilated delusions, qua
psychotic states, to dreams on the basis of phenomenology.
Others have noted similarities in the neurobiological profile of
psychotic and delusional patients. Clearly delusions are not sim-
ply waking dreams and, in any case, both delusions and dreams
are heterogeneous phenomena. Nonetheless there is an intuition
here worth pursuing. That intuition turns out to be reflected in
terms of the cognitive properties of the default mode network.
The default mode network is essentially a cognitive system that
produces story elements or fragments that allow a subject to
situate experiences in a narrative context. Dreams reflect the
operations of that system relatively disconnected from both
the external world and from higher-level cognitive supervision.
Delusions are produced by activities in the default system in a
waking state which has a number of cognitive biases introduced
at different levels of cognitive processing. Accurately describing
the operations of the default mode network and its interactions
with other systems on a case-by-case basis in both delusions and
dreams is a viable research program. Here I have tried to begin
the project by focusing on the interactions of the default mode
network and the face recognition system in delusional, dreaming
and neurotypical waking states characterized by the experience
of “hyperfamiliarity.” The Table 1 below describes the basic
cognitive properties of each state and the way hyperfamiliarity
arises and is dealt with in each case.
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Table 1 | Summarizing cognitive similarities and differences between dreams and delusions.
Cognitive mode Wake NREM REM Delusion (e.g. Fregoli consequent
on hyperfamiliarity)
Automatic processing Acquisition and
manipulation of
information
Iteration of information Endogenously driven
associative processing
Anomalies of experience become
hypersalient
Face processing Binding driven by
perception Fleeting
hyperfamilarity (déjà vu)
Intact percepts Binding elements
dissociate (hyperfamiliarity)
Sustained hyperfamiliarity
Default though Subjective context for
salient experience
Rehearses stereotyped
narrative fragments
Incoherent narrative
fragments
Hyperactive, not regulated by
decontextualized processes
Decontextualized thought Reality testing,
metacognition
Deactivated Deactivated Hypoactive or inaccessible for
delusional content
PHENOMENOLOGY
Perception External vivid Dull or absent Internal vivid Sustained hypersalience may be
discrete or global.
Movement Continuous voluntary Episodic involuntary Commanded but inhibited Voluntary
Thought Logical, coherent
progressive
Logical, coherent
perseverative
Incoherent, associative Focused on delusional topics and
narrative associations. Absent
reality testing
NEUROCHEMISTRY
5HT (serotonin) High Decreasing at end of cycle Low
NA(noradrenaline)
Acetylcholine Low Increasing at end of cycle High
DA (dopamine) Salience within a
functioning control
hierarchy
Tonic, stabilises patterns of
representation
Phasic, modulates
turmover of
representations
Effect of neurotransmitter
abnormality in delusion is to up
regulate default system. Varies
from case to case. Established for
schizophrenia. Produces sustained
hypersalience, global or local
Schwartz and Maquet (2002, p. 29) point out that it is char-
acteristic of bizarre experiences in REM dreams that quite incon-
gruous experiences are accepted “without much surprise.” Their
choice of words is quite apposite within the increasingly influen-
tial Bayesian framework for understanding the mind. Within that
framework the technical term given to error signals is “surprisal”
since they signal that information inconsistent with a prior model
of a cognitive domain cannot be accommodated by the relevant
cognitive system.
The experience of hyperfamiliarity characteristic of delu-
sions of misidentification is an instance of the detection of
surprisal. It is a case of a signal of familiarity mismatched
to an unfamiliar face. In a delusional mind the DMN per-
forms its normal role, generating a narrative fragment, which
is subjectively adequate to the experience. By this I mean
it provides a context for it that makes it intelligible in
terms of agency and intention. The process is similar to
that involved in thinking “I’ve been here before” consequent
on a déjà vu experience. Similar experiences and responses
occur in classes of REM dreams characterized by activity in
the DMN.
Whether we describe such thoughts in waking cognition, when
maintained in the face of contrary background beliefs, as delu-
sions or confabulations, a crucial factor in their maintenance
seems to be reduced activity in the rDLPFC. When the rDLPFC
is hypo or inactive the mind is hostage to the functioning of
the DMN.
Pace-Schott (2013) has a distinctive account of DMN func-
tioning (that the dreaming mind in REM sleep is a mind in
story telling mode) whose details do not matter to the key point.
The DMN is necessary for the construction (and no doubt the
consumption) of narrative. In essence the DMN constructs rep-
resentations of events and scenes which treat experiences as
elements in a story. In order to construct a coherent story the
default network needs a degree of supervision: the story needs
a goal or endpoint. That goal might be a future action or a
current event depending on whether the DMN is providing con-
text for a planned or actual experience. In REM dreams of the
type discussed here there is no current context for the experi-
ence: the mind is not engaged in planning, inference, decision
making or engaging with the environment via perceptual and
sensory systems. Hence the normal patterns of cognitive process-
ing are suspended. In particular, anomalies and incongruities,
which would normally initiate a train of error detection and
correction, do not activate any metacognitive responses. The sit-
uation is different in lucid dreams (in which situations may be
recognized as bizarre) or intermediate cases in which dreams
rehearse segments of coherent waking life. Nonetheless it does
remain striking that dream reports almost never include episodes
of focused, sustained, metacognitive problem solving.
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Such facts merely confirm some ideas developing within
dream theory: dreams are not all-or-nothing states of represen-
tational chaos. They reflect the mind’s structure and operations
under a range of different conditions. In one such condition
which generates bizarre experiences of hyperfamiliarity the DMN
is relatively uncoupled from other systems with which it normally
cooperates and is endogenously activated by subcortical inputs. If
Pace-Schott is correct then the DMN in this condition generates
story fragments and episodes which reflect disinhibited patterns
of association.
The hypothesis presented here is that delusions arise when
experiences trigger activity in a cognitive system, the DMN, that
evolved to manufacture story elements: the raw material of auto-
biographical narratives. Delusional thoughts survive in the mind
when those narrative fragments are not treated as descriptions
of reality or hypotheses or about the causes of experience. The
causes of this insulation, which may not be absolute, vary from
case to case but the evidence from dreaming supports the idea
that a crucial neurocognitive system recruits the rDLPFC.
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